Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Ignorance and New Filing Rules by White, James J.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1995
Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old
Ignorance and New Filing Rules
James J. White
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
White, James J., "Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Ignorance and New Filing Rules" (1995). Minnesota Law Review. 1574.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1574
Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old
Ignorance and New Filing Rules
James J. White*
The other papers in this Symposium demonstrate that we
have the technical capacity to build a filing system that will ex-
ceed the expectations of Grant Gilmore in every dimension.1
With more thought about what is put into the system and more
clever software to get it out, the most sophisticated system possi-
ble under current technology will store and produce enough in-
formation about a debtor to give the ACLU a fright.
All of the issues on improving the filing system are impor-
tant, but I do not concern myself with any of them directly. I am
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
1. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation
Should Be the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 M-si. L.
REV. 577 (1995).
Of course, there are many questions and doubtless many trade offs involved
with the construction of a new filing system. But I am certain our federalist
politics will keep us from achieving all that technology will offer. First among
the Federalists is the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. Its determined insistence on making these filings state law and state gov-
erned is a stumbling block to the kind of nationwide system that a national and
international economy demands. See WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF
SERVICE, A CENTENNAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF COMMISSION-
ERS ON UNIFoRM STATE LAws 129-31 (1991) (describing the need to draft and
enact uniform state laws in the area of commercial law). Even if the states can
be persuaded to adopt modern flexible computer based systems, and even if all
states adopt Professor LoPucki's filing at the place of incorporation, we will have
a system still short of our technological capacity but far beyond today's paper-
bound systems. See LoPucki, supra, at 581, 591.
Some states have already made great strides. In Louisiana, creditors may
make a UCC filing for all security interests, except those in motor vehicles, with
the clerk of court of any parish regardless of the location of the property. L.
REv. STAT. Am. § 10:9-401(1)(b) (West 1993). All filings are put into a central
database accessible from all parishes. Searchers may access the database
through the clerk of court of any parish and receive filing information for inter-
ests filed anywhere in the state. In Nebraska, all filings at the state level are
made at one central location, and local filings are made in each county. NEB.
REv. STAT. § 9-401 (Reissue 1980). Both state and local filing information is put
into one database and can be searched through any office of the Secretary of
State.
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here to discuss a different question. In light of the proposed new
filing system, this Article asks what legal rights should accrue to
the first to file. One might argue that my essay is out of place in
a Symposium that deals with filing. But filing does have legal
purpose, not so? There is no filing for filing's sake. At minimum,
the energy that the filing project deserves might be influenced by
the legal consequences, and the propriety of certain legal conse-
quences may depend on the nature of the available filing system.
One of my hypotheses is that reform in filing may call for reallo-
cation of risks between filers and searchers.
I approach the issue of what legal rights should flow from
filing with three questions. I first ask what we know about the
uses of the system. I then ask what rights should be granted
based on that knowledge and based on our ideas of fairness and
efficiency. Finally, I ask how those rights should change in the
face of new filing systems that will make the collection and dis-
semination of reliable information cheaper and easier.
I. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT CREDITOR BEHAVIOR?
HOW IS THAT KNOWLEDGE RELEVANT?
One of the Ten Commandments of Mercantile Law is that an
effective filing system is the center pole that holds up the entire
personal property security tent. When I recall thirty years of
teaching Article 9, I can hear myself in October classes extolling
the Article 9 filing system:
This filing system is an integral part of the most sophisticated se-
cured lending known to mankind. Only by an effective filing system can
a secured lender know of other lenders and only by it can later secured
lenders and unsecured lenders be encouraged to lend. Without such a
system, lenders would grow wary, commerce would be hobbled, and the
manifold commercial ends that are met by commercial lenders would be
stunted, rendered more costly, or stymied altogether. Every day
thousands or tens of thousands of secured and unsecured lenders
search the files and act in reliance on the information found there.
I can see generations of law students writing this down and re-
peating this incantation in negotiations, in court, and elsewhere.
This view even extends to Americans abroad who approach the
English, Dutch, and Germans with an air of superiority, assert-
ing the superiority of our filing system and belittling the Euro-
pean efforts2 to put together a filing system worthy of the name.
2. See generally SEcUtrrY ON MOVABLE PROPERTY AND RECEIVABLES IN Eu-
ROPE (Michael G. Dickson et al. eds., 1988) (discussing systems for obtaining
security interests in Europe); Enrico Gabrielli, Security over Movables in Italy, J.
Bus. L., Sept. 1992, at 525, 531, 542 (Italy) (discussing security interests and
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These encomiums of the Article 9 filing system rest on two
assumptions that are seldom challenged. First is the assumption
that a significant percentage of lenders, secured and unsecured,
rely on the state of the filing records to find out about prior per-
fected secured creditors. Second is the assumption that the be-
havior of these creditors would be different if there were no such
system. For many creditors in modern industrial society, these
assumptions are not accurate. It would come as some surprise to
find that the mine run trade lender in the Bronx ever checks the
files in Albany. It is similarly doubtful that the plumber, the car-
penter, or even the general or sub-contractor, checks the files or
collects data from the files through a reporting service such as
Dun & Bradstreet. Surely, the mainline secured creditors, the
banks, GMAC, GECC, who file to perfect their own interests
must also check the files. One would expect any filer to have
checked the files.
But what reliance do these filers place on the filing system?
And more to the point, how would they behave in the absence of a
filing system? Any creditor that is to be the principal inventory,
equipment, or account receivable lender to a substantial mercan-
tile enterprise will have many sources of information about the
prospective borrower; the filing system is unlikely to be the most
important source. The debtor and the debtor's records are obvi-
ous sources of information. Even if the debtor is not forthcoming,
there may be signs in its books and records. Doubtless creditors
collect information from one another. None of these is a perfect
source of information, but of course neither is the filing system.
That secured financing can flourish in modern industrial Euro-
pean economies in the absence of an effective filing system
should also cause us to question our assumptions. Because filing
is usually necessary to defeat a trustee in bankruptcy, one can-
not even infer from the large number of filings that filers rely
upon the system to defeat other secured creditors. Their filings
may be mostly insurance against bankruptcy.
If the only function of the filing system is to enable a creditor
to defeat a trustee in bankruptcy, and if no creditor relies upon
filings or the absence of filings, we should abolish the filing sys-
tem. We could save time and effort by direct subordination of the
trustee in bankruptcy to any effective security interest, whether
giving notice in Italy); Lech Choroszucha, Secured Transactions in Poland: Prac-
ticable Rules, Unworkable Monstrosities, and Pending Reforms, 17 HASTINGS
INT'L & COmp. L. REv. 389, 397 (1994) (evaluating the current regulation of se-
curity interests in Poland).
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or not perfected. Indeed, if that is the state of nature, almost
every penny spent in drafting laws for filing systems and operat-
ing those systems is wasted.
Given the assertions of secured creditors about the impor-
tance of the filing system, it seems unlikely that the world in the
United States is as I describe it. It is more plausible that many
secured creditors and perhaps even some unsecured creditors
rely on the filing system to inform them about their debtor's liens
and about their probable priority.
I raise these questions not because I believe there are no
creditors who rely on the filing system, but because by hyperbole
I hope to emphasize our ignorance about the behavior of credi-
tors. I want us to confront the issue about what law is best
adopted when one must legislate in the absence of good informa-
tion about existing creditor behavior and about potential creditor
response to new laws. Creditors are not potted plants; they can
and surely will react in many and unpredictable ways to new
law. Recognizing that there are effective and apparently efficient
lending systems in Europe, in countries that do not have filing
systems like our own, and understanding that there are alterna-
tive sources for much of the information that a filing system pro-
vides, the drafters should approach the assertions of secured
creditors with some skepticism, and should at least understand
that they are drafting law based on assumptions about and in
considerable ignorance of creditor behavior.
II. EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF A PERFECT
FILING SYSTEM: GOOD COMMERCIAL LAW
AND BAD
At least as important as the qualities of the filing system
itself is the consequence of a proper filing. What rights should
attach to the first to file? Should that person beat all others, beat
most people, or should the first to file achieve superiority over
only low lying snakes like the trustee in bankruptcy and lien
creditors?
At the highest level of generality most of us would agree that
the legal consequences that attach to the first filing should be
fair and efficient. What is fair? For this purpose I define a rule
as fair if it meets legitimate expectations of a reasonable busi-
ness person who is not necessarily familiar with the rule. If, for
example, every banker, debtor, and business person would expect
a purchase money lender to take priority over a prior perfected
security interest, then purchase money priority is fair. If, on the
[Vol. 79:529532
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other hand, the expectations are reversed, by my definition the
converse is fair. Because the expectations of the fully informed
are necessarily affected by the rule itself, I test fairness by the
reaction of reasonably intelligent but uninformed players.
What is efficient? An efficient system is easy and inexpen-
sive to use. Filing requirements that are quirky, cranky, or ex-
pensive are not efficient. In addition, the rules of priority must
be certain. Certainty promotes efficiency because it allows the
parties who do not wish to be governed by the rule to know what
and how to negotiate to avoid the rule. Certainty minimizes liti-
gation and the cost of litigation because outcomes are predict-
able. Finally, an efficient system facilitates socially desirable
transactions. If it is socially desirable that security and priority
be easy to get, our system should facilitate that. If, however, the
same transactions would occur at no greater cost without a filing
system, then even an inexpensive filing system may be
inefficient.
To understand the difficulties that a legal drafter of a filing
and priority system encounters, let reality intrude a little.
Although there will be wide agreement on the goals of efficiency
and fairness, that apparent consensus will give way to disagree-
ment and even bitter conflict when one considers specific propos-
als based upon these theories.
Our ignorance about the actual use of the system helps disa-
greement. We have no clear idea about the number and kind of
persons who rely on the filing system in making decisions. Sec-
ond, we are ignorant, except in the grossest way, of the true ex-
pectations of the parties to this system. Do purchase money
lenders expect to be first? Do others expect them to be first? Or
do purchase money lenders expect to be first only when they have
procured a subordination agreement from a prior lender? Does
this differ from region to region and among types of collateral?
Moreover, we are almost completely ignorant about and
would fall into quick disagreement over the effect of a sophisti-
cated filing system on mercantile transactions. We see countries
with the most sophisticated filing systems, such as Norway's,
3
3. John Schielderup Olaisen, of Norway Group, A.S., provided the follow-
ing information on the Norwegian filing system.
Under the Collateral Law of 1980, Norway has two separate systems of reg-
isters-one for real estate and another for movable assets. Real estate registra-
tion covers real estate, land, buildings, and other assets that can be identified by
a particular assigned property identification number. Real estate registration is
mandatory and must be made locally by filing documents in one of the 88 local
court offices. All local filings are updated daily onto one central register. Coin-
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and nearby countries such as the Netherlands and Germany
with crude-some would say nonexistent-systems.4 It is hard
to argue that Germany's or Holland's commerce, much less Brit-
ain's, suffers for want of a good filing system. The filing system
hardly looks like a significant variable in the formula for a suc-
cessful mercantile economy (but for the purpose of this Sympo-
sium, let's disregard that lugubrious possibility).
This Paper cannot define fairness and efficiency in Article 9.
My model for measuring fairness is not the only choice. Should
we measure fairness by the expectations of the person I have
posed, the reasonably intelligent but uninformed player, or
should it be a person who knows the law and acts in response to
it? Fairness to one is not necessarily fairness to the other.
Note, too, that there is no reliable testimony on what is effi-
cient. The Drafting Committee for the revision of Article 9 will
be assailed at every meeting by representatives of secured credi-
tors, unsecured creditors, subsets of each, and perhaps even
debtors. Each of these representatives will feel free to character-
ize various players' motivation and behavior and to predict how
some like and others unlike themselves will behave in the face of
new law. Many of these statements will be self-serving. None of
them will be backed up by the kind of rigorous examination of
practice that would satisfy social scientists. For both of those
mercial users can access the system through an online communication system
and retrieve all Norwegian registrations by named person or property identifica-
tion number regardless of the location of the local filing. The general public can
access the system at no charge by visiting, faxing, or phoning any local court
office.
Registration of movable assets is voluntary and includes assets such as in-
ventory, receivables, machinery, livestock, and automobiles. Security interests
in these items are recorded in a central registry by sending the documents to a
central location where they are scanned into the system and returned to the
sender as certified originals-no documents or copies are maintained in hard
copy. Although the movable asset registry is not integrated with the real estate
registry, the two can be reached through the same online system by commercial
users. The general public can access the central registry directly by fax, phone,
or letter.
This computerization of the Norwegian filing system has greatly increased
the availability of quick, direct access by the commercial market to reliable and
updated information on security interests. This in turn has led to improved se-
curity on lending and greater access to capital for Norwegian businesses. Nor-
way Group, A.S. has recently been assigned export rights to the Norwegian filing
systems and software, and has been selected to design and implement the com-
puterization of the Polish filing system.
4. See SEcuRrrY ON MOVABLE PROPERTY AND RECEIVABLES IN EUROPE,
supra note 2, at 58-74, 123-41 (examining existing filing systems, or lack
thereof, in the Netherlands and Germany).
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reasons, most of these assertions deserve limited credence. The
drafters of the filing system and of the priority system that de-
pends upon it must grope their way in ignorance and in the face
of confusing, if earnest, assertions about the state of nature,
about parties' intentions, and about the effect of legal revision on
that behavior.
How should a drafter of commercial law respond to this kind
of ignorance? Perhaps the drafters should leave well enough
alone. After all, secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and debt-
ors have all accommodated in one way or another to the existing
Article 9. If one must concede ignorance about the consequence
of one's action, perhaps no action should be taken. Whatever the
virtue of that argument, it has been left in the dust. The caravan
is now in motion and Article 9, for better or worse, will be
redrafted.
Like the physician, at the least we should do no harm. That
means that the new law should be simple, easily changed by
agreement, and should impose the smallest transaction costs
possible. At minimum we can draft law that does not increase
transaction costs-whether or not the law is wise in other re-
spects. Perhaps we can reduce transaction costs; that alone is a
worthy aim for a drafter otherwise ignorant of the law's impact.
I think ignorance argues in favor of my proposal: to grant prior-
ity to the first to file and to force others to defend their right to
superiority over the first to file. My proposal has the virtue of
certainty and ease of understanding. It imposes the most modest
of transaction costs, and it is likely to cause little litigation.
III. FIRST TO FILE, THE KING?
As a touchstone against which to measure proposals for pri-
ority and in the face of our ignorance about the state of parties'
motivations and intentions, I start with the hypothesis that the
first to file should defeat all others, both those coming before and
those coming after. I propose that we examine each exception to
that rule by testing it against our ideas of fairness and efficiency,
recognizing always that we are making these decisions in consid-
erable ignorance.
A priori, making the first to file victorious over all others has
much to commend it. Every priority system that I know of has
some form of first-in-time first-in-right rule. Crudely, therefore,
it meets the expectations of many persons in many circum-
stances. It is efficient too. At minimum it facilitates one transac-
tion that is probably socially desirable, namely, a loan by the first
1995] 535
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to file. Like all rigid rules it is certain to a fault and, if the filing
proposals that are before this Symposium are adopted, will be
inexpensive. Certainty will make it easy to know when and how
one must negotiate out of the rule and will make the outcome of
litigation so predictable that one expects priority litigation to
melt away to nothing.
A. RiGHTs OF THE FIRST TO FILE UNDER CURRENT LAw
I group the parties who challenge the first to file into three
sets. The first is prior parties. The second is later claimants to
the same collateral. The third is later claimants to derivative or
after-acquired collateral.
Many whose rights arise prior to the first to file enjoy prior-
ity over the first to file under current law. First of these prior
parties is the holder of a title to collateral that was never trans-
ferred to the debtor. This group includes the lessor who leases
goods to the debtor,5 the true owner of the collateral whose goods
are stolen and passed to the debtor,6 and possibly others who
have rights to reclaim the goods from the debtor and from third
parties. 7 Another party whose rights arise earlier than the first
5. See U.C.C. § 2A-305 & cmt. (1990).
6. Here the thief has void title and thus cannot pass good title to the
debtor under UCC § 2-403(1). See, e.g., United States v. Michaels Jewelers, Inc.,
42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 141, 145 (D. Conn. 1985) (title for stolen goods
did not pass); Justice v. Fabey, 541 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (where
truck seized by police on grounds that it was stolen property was later sold to
third party who in turn sold to plaintiff, good title was destroyed by initial theft);
Anderson Contracting Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 448 So. 2d 37, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (innocent purchaser of stolen property has no rights against rightful
owner); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Ring Power Corp., 450 So. 2d 1245, 1249 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (possessor by theft cannot convey good title to bona fide
purchaser); Bay Springs Forest Prods., Inc. v. Wade, 435 So. 2d 690, 692 (Miss.
1983) (trespasser who cut timber on plaintiff's land acquired void as opposed to
voidable title); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Estes, 345 So. 2d 265, 266 (Miss. 1977) (bona
fide purchaser of stolen vehicle received void title); Touch of Class Leasing v.
Mercedes-Benz Credit, Inc., 591 A.2d 661, 668 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (seller
was thief unable to pass good title), cert. denied, 599 A.2d 166 (N.J. 1991); In re
Petition of Hennessey, 494 A.2d 853 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (seller of stolen truck
passed void title); Marvin v. Connelly, 252 S.E.2d 562, 565 (S.C. 1979) (no title to
vehicle passed where defendant, unaware that vehicle was stolen, brought fore-
closure action on mechanic's lien and later sold vehicle to plaintiff); Olin Corp. v.
Cargo Carriers, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 211, 217 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holder of stolen
property cannot pass title to third party, unless true owner by some affirmative
act creates apparent authority or clothes seller with some indicia of ownership).
7. Kahr v. Markland, 543 N.E.2d 579 (IlM. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 548
N.E.2d 1069 (IM. 1989). In this case, the court affirmed a replevin order di-
recting a buyer of silver from Goodwill Industries to return the silver to the
plaintiffs, from whom Goodwill acquired possession of the silver. Id. at 580.
[Vol. 79:529
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to file, but who takes priority under Article 9, is the secured cred-
itor who has perfected its security interest by taking possession.
Section 9-312(5) gives that person priority.8
But there are many other prior parties subordinate to the
first filer. Among those are the takers of an earlier, but un-
perfected, security interest,9 and sellers of goods on unsecured
credit under section 2-702 who are not paid.10 They also include
Goodwill acquired the silver when plaintiffs unknowingly left the bags contain-
ing the silver with Goodwill (at the time, plaintiffs believed the bags contained
only clothes). Id. Relying on comments added by the Illinois legislature, the
court ruled that "entrustment" under UCC § 2-403(2) and (3) requires a "volun-
tary" transfer of possession. Id. at 581-82. Therefore, the court reasoned, the
plaintiffs' mistake did not constitute entrustment and they were entitled to a
replevin order against the buyers from Goodwill. Id. at 582; see, e.g., Textile
Supplies, Inc. v. Garrett, 687 F.2d 123, 127 (5th Cir. 1982) (where plaintiff's
salesman stole carpet from plaintiff and then sold carpet to defendant, defend-
ant did not acquire title under UCC § 2-403(1)(d) because plaintiff never dealt
with wrongdoer in the transaction); In re Woods Farmers Coop. Elevator Co.,
107 B.R. 678, 680 (Bankr. N.D. 1989) (bailee has no rights in collateral); In re
Shamrock Coal Co., 47 B.R. 867, 868 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (equipment installed by
construction company in debtor's plant not subject to creditor's security interest
in equipment because equipment had been installed on purely experimental ba-
sis, experiment failed, and no contract of sale to debtor existed); Youngblood v.
Bailey, 459 So. 2d 855, 858 (Ala. 1984) (plaintiff defrauded defendant out of win-
ning lottery ticket by bad check, then transferred winnings of ticket to third
party; court held that third party received void as opposed to voidable title, and
thus winnings reverted to defendant); Chartered Bank v. Chrysler Corp., 171
Cal. Rptr. 748, 750-51 (Ct. App. 1981) (where seller never had interest in boat,
purchaser could not acquire rights in boat and security interest of purchaser's
financer thus never attached); State Bank of Young Am. v. Wagener, 479
N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (debtor only had possession of pigs in order
to fatten them and had no rights in the collateral); Disch v. Raven Transfer &
Storage Co., 561 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (tenant in furnished
house had no power to pledge furnishings); Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 208
N.W.2d 97, 103 (Wis. 1973) (seller did not acquire rights in goods returned by
buyer for adjustment), overruled on other grounds, Daniel v. Bank of Hayward,
425 N.W.2d 416 (Wis. 1988).
8. "Confliciting security interests rank according to priority in time of fil-
ing or perfection." U.C.C. § 9-312(5). Possession is one means of perfecting a
security interest. Id. § 9-305.
9. Id. § 9-312(5)(a).
10. An unsecured seller's right to reclaim goods that buyer received on
credit while insolvent is subject to rights of a buyer in the ordinary course and
good faith purchasers. Id. § 2-702(3); see In re MacMillan Petroleum (Arkansas),
Inc., 115 B.R. 175, 179 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990) (unpaid seller seeking to reclaim
under § 2-702 loses to a good faith purchaser from the debtor under § 2-702(3);
under § 1-201(32)-(33), floating lienor is a good faith purchaser); In re Lawrence
Paperboard, Corp., 52 B.R. 907, 910 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (interest of an un-
paid seller in goods delivered to buyer is subordinate to interest of a secured
party who qualifies as a good faith purchaser); Petroleum Specialities, Inc. v.
McLouth Steel Corp., 22 B.R. 722 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (seller's right to re-
claim is subject to claims of a good faith purchaser).
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others who somehow grant voidable title in a fraudulent transfer
to the debtor, who then passes good title to the secured creditor
acting as a good faith purchaser. These secured creditors are
protected by section 2-403.11
The final group of prior parties is the earlier secured creditor
who has done an improper filing that is somehow discovered by
the first to file. That klutz is saved by the diligence of our first to
file creditor when the King discovers the improperly filed financ-
ing statement. Section 9-401(2) says so. 12
All of these groups have one thing in common: their claims
arise prior to the King's filing. They are mixed willy nilly with a
number of other persons, such as prior but unperfected secured
creditors and prior unsecured creditors, who are subordinated to
the first to file King.
A second set that currently has priority over the King is
later claimants to the same collateral. There are at least three
classes whose claims to the collateral arise after the King's filing
as to the very same collateral, but who still enjoy superiority over
the King's claim. Most prominent of these is the buyer in the
ordinary course under section 9-307.13 Also superior are certain
11. U.C.C. § 2-403(1). See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Mills Oil Co., 717 F.2d 208,
211-12 (5th Cir. 1983) (owner of voidable title cannot transfer good title to one
who lacks good faith); Los Angeles Paper Bag Co. v. James Talcott, Inc., 604
F.2d 38, 40 (9th Cir. 1979) (delivery of goods to third party was sufficient to pass
buyer's rights and title, perfecting floating lien); In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d
1238, 1241 (5th Cir.) (perfected security interest prevails over interest of an un-
paid seller in delivered goods), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); General Elec.
Credit Corp. v. Tidwell Indus., 565 P.2d 868, 870-71 (Ariz. 1977) (en banc) (de-
faulting buyer has the power to transfer title to a good faith purchaser); Charles
Evans BMW, Inc. v. Williams, 395 S.E.2d 650, 651-52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (im-
poster bought car from owner with fraudulent check, thus acquiring voidable
title which became good title on resale to car dealer under UCC § 2-403(a)(1));
Western Idaho Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Simplot Feed Lots, Inc., 678 P.2d 52, 54-55
(Idaho 1984) (where farmer never received payment for barley sold to third
party who in turn sold to bona fide purchaser, voidable title passed to bona fide
purchaser); Peck v. Augustin Bros. Co., 279 N.W.2d 397, 399-400 (Neb. 1979)
(conditional sales of cattle, paid by draft in commercially immediate time frame
and treated as money by parties, were cash sales governed by the UCC); Gus Z.
Lancaster's Stock Yards, Inc. v. Williams, 246 S.E.2d 823,826-27 (N.C. Ct. App.
1978) (corporate defendant who accepted pigs in satisfaction of pre-existing
debts was acting as an agent and could not be a good faith purchaser); Big Knob
Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 487 A.2d 953, 956-58 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (seller who ordered and received, but did not pay for, chassis of
fire truck, had power to transfer all rights to buyer).
12. U.C.C. § 9-401(2).
13. Id. § 9-307(1) ("A buyer in ordinary course of business ... takes free of a
security interest created by his seller.. .).
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lien creditors 14 and some nonordinary course buyers.15 A second
group of candidates who also take priority is ordinary course pur-
chasers of chattel paper and instruments, 16 and holders in due
course of negotiable instruments. 17 In some cases these parties
take priority despite their knowledge of the King's claims. Last
are creditors whose interests arise after the goods move across
state lines or, with respect to intangibles, after the debtor moves
across a state line. Section 9-103 elevates these persons as to the
very same collateral.
A third group, later claimants to derivative or after-acquired
collateral, also currently takes priority over the first to file.
There are three classes here, too. The most important are
purchase money creditors. They enjoy priority under sections 9-
312(3) and 9-312(4) to the extent they finance new purchasers
and promptly perfect and, with respect to inventory, give notice
to prior secured creditors.' 8 Second are persons with perfected
security interests in proceeds in circumstances where filing
should be made in another state, or in the rare case, where the
original filing was local as to the collateral but should have been
in the Secretary of State's office with respect to proceeds or vice
versa. The final class is secured creditors who take security in-
terests in debtor's collateral more than four months after the
plaintiff has reorganized or changed its name. These enjoy prior-
ity by virtue of section 9-402(7), which invalidates the King's
early filing when the original filing becomes substantially
misleading.
When one summarizes the rights of the first to file under
current law, it is hard to see the principle that earns the King
priority in certain circumstances and subordinates the King in
others. A skeptic might say that the priority rules in Articles 2
and 9 are no more than a set of ad hoc rules that portray the
power and interests of the parties that influenced the drafting of
Articles 2 and 9. Although there may be a kernel of truth to that
claim, I suspect that the complexities of and variation in the un-
derlying transactions call for varied rules and sometimes obscure
14. Id. § 9-301(4) ("A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security
interest is perfected takes subject to the security interest....").
15. Id. § 9-307(3) ("A buyer other than a buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness... takes free of a security interest. .. ").
16. Id. § 9-308 (concerning purchase of chattel paper and instruments).
17. Id. § 9-309 (concerning protection of purchasers of instruments, docu-
ments, and securities).
18. Id. § 9-312(3) (purchase money security interest in inventory); id. § 9-
312(4) (purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory).
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the guiding principles. Even if there is a principle somewhere in
this dung heap, the hodge podge of current rules on priority
should not satisfy us.
B. REVISING CURRENT PRIORITY, FILERS VS. SEARCHERS UNDER
A REVISED FILING SYSTEM
Treating first filer as King, let us now consider the argu-
ments of each of the competitors who currently enjoys priority
over the King. To do that, I propose to canvas the arguments
that have traditionally been given for priority of these persons
and also to speculate about the virtues and vices of making the
King superior. In some cases efficiency may point one way and
fairness another. Never mind that the firmest conclusions about
fairness and efficiency will be erected, beam on pillar, on empiri-
cal sand.
1. Parties with Prior Claims
Under the current Code, filing is everything as to certain
competitors whose claims arise prior to the filing; it is nothing as
to others. In the former group are creditors who take security
interests, but have failed to perfect those interests. The filing
and priority rules of Article 9 are aimed directly at them; a prin-
cipal consequence of being the first to file is priority over them.
Under the pure race provisions of section 9-312, that priority is
conferred even over unperfected creditors whose security claims
are known to the King at the time of the King's filing.
A different rule applies when the prior party has possession
of the goods, and so is perfected prior to the competitor's filing, or
where the prior party has done an ineffective filing (for example,
in the wrong place) that is discovered by the first to file. In these
two cases, the first to file is subordinated. In the first case, the
earlier party's possession subordinates the first to file. 19 In the
second case, the filer's knowledge of the contents of the financing
statement subordinates the first to file under section 9-401(2).
"Title" claimants-those who claim title to the goods and
who are not characterized as secured creditors by sections 2-
401(1) or 1-201(37)-are untouched by another's filing. An exam-
ple is a lessor of goods who has priority under section 2A-305.
Another example is an owner whose goods were stolen and trans-
ferred to the debtor before granting the security interest to the
first to file. That person would have priority over the King under
19. Id. § 9-312.
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the provisions of and negative implications in sections 2-401 and
2-403.20 As to that group and as to others who sold goods to the
debtor in fraudulent transactions, and so gave the debtor voida-
ble title, the filing in Article 9 is irrelevant. Nothing in Article 2
or Article 9 purports to give the filer greater rights vis-h-vis a
prior party whose goods have been stolen or a lessor of goods or
similar person simply because the competitor has filed a financ-
ing statement under Article 9. In these cases the priority rules
lurk in Article 2, and the King achieves priority only because he
qualifies as a bona fide purchaser under section 2-403 or under
section 2-702. Those sections of Article 2 govern only if no provi-
sion of that Article, such as section 2-401 or section 2-326, or of
Article 1, such as section 1-201(37), turns the "title claimant"
into a secured creditor.
In effect there are two universes; the King appears in both
but his competitors appear in only one. On the one hand, the
King fights as a bona fide purchaser under Articles 2 or 2A
against lessors and other title claimants. Sections 2-403 and 2A-
305 are properly considered non-Article 9 priority rules. On the
other hand, it is under Article 9 that the King confronts others
who are converted into secured creditors by section 2-401 or
whose documentation acknowledges them to be secured credi-
tors. In this case the King's priority depends almost entirely on
its filing.
a. Prior "Title" Claimants
Should a first filing earn any rights against title claimants
(such as lessors) whose rights predate the secured creditor's and
who do not assert secured creditor status? The real estate re-
cording statutes show that it is possible for a filing to earn one
priority not only over a prior secured creditor, but also over prior
title holders. 21 When A transfers title of real estate to B, who
fails to record, and A later transfers title to C, who records its
interest, C will have priority over B if C recorded without notice
of B's interest.22 To attach similar rights to the first to file under
Article 9 with respect to a personal property interest (i.e., to give
that person priority over lessors and other owners who have not
filed) might have the virtue of efficiency, but the filing system
20. See supra note 6 (citing cases involving attempts to pass title of stolen
goods).
21. See 4 AimucRICA LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.5 (A. James Casner et al. eds,
1952).
22. Id.
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just does not accommodate it. It is now well recognized that one
derives and protects title to real estate partly by recording one's
deed. That is not true of personal property. With rare excep-
tions, such as automobiles, one expects to get good title to per-
sonal property by paying the price and taking a bill of sale from
the prior owner. Unless one takes or gives security, one need not
and does not expect to worry about the personal property filing
system-at least as to subsequent transferees of one's transferor.
There is no mechanism for filing, and no expectation that an
"owner" of personal property will file a public document showing
its interest.23 Thus, to say that a lessor or other innocent title
holder should be divested by a subsequent party's filing a financ-
ing statement is like subordinating the title holder or lessor be-
cause the holder is blue eyed; it has nothing to do with that
interest. Our law neither requires nor even offers a system for
recording title to personal property of the kind offered for real
estate.24
There is, of course, a gray area between the two universes.
Here we find quasi secured creditors, those who "retain title"
thinking they are "owners" but who are thrown by section 2-401
into Article 9 and are characterized by section 2-401 as mere se-
cured creditors. There is a similar troublesome overlay in sec-
tions 2-702, 2-326, and 2-403. Presumably that is an inefficiency
with which we can live; it does not outweigh the unfairness that
would attend the subordination of unsuspecting owners under
Article 9.
b. Prior Secured Creditors
Of course, secured creditors who have failed to perfect are
subordinate to subsequent creditors who file financing state-
ments. Under the pure race rules of section 9-312, they are
subordinate even though the filer has knowledge of their inter-
ests when it files. That is a central rule of Article 9 and one that
suggests the drafters favored efficiency over fairness as the long-
term interest of society when the two appear to clash. Pure race
23. In contrast, several Canadian provinces have enacted Personal Property
Security Acts, which "provide no exemption from registration for security inter-
ests in consumer goods"; some provinces consider commercial leases with a term
over one year to be security agreements for purposes of perfection. Ronald C.C.
Cuming, Computerization of Personal Property Security Registries: What the Ca-
nadian Experience Presages for the United States, 23 UCC L.J. 331, 333 (1991).
24. Subordinating a lessor for failure to file would reverse the decision made
in Article 2A to recognize the lessor's priority over creditors of the lessee even
though the lessor has never filed a financing statement.
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is hard to defend on micro-fairness grounds, i.e., fairness to this
person. It can be defended on macro-fairness grounds, i.e., fair-
ness to all over the long term. But macro-fairness is probably no
more than efficiency; the pure race rules facilitate transactions
and minimize litigation, and therefore the grand effect is fair
even at the cost of unfairness to a few whose interests are
subordinated to later claimants who file with knowledge of those
interests.
But what of unperfected secured creditors who have made
an ineffective attempt to perfect-they have filed in the wrong
place-and whose filing has been uncovered by the unusually dil-
igent search of the King? They are protected by section 9-
401(2).25 If the first to fie discovers an earlier filing, that party
is burdened by the knowledge of the data contained in that fi-
nancing statement and, if it applies to the same collateral the
party claims, it subordinates the first to file's claim.
Why should those who file in the wrong place earn priority
because of others' diligence? Under section 9-312 the first filer
could have full knowledge about the claims of a prior unperfected
but secured creditor and yet be superior.2 6 If that knowledge de-
rived directly from the debtor or from another secured creditor,
the King's filing would earn priority over that person, but if the
King found the information in an earlier but ineffective filing, the
King would be subordinate.27 I do not understand why the
source of that knowledge commands different outcomes.
The argument for the abolition of section 9-401(2) gains
strength if the filing proposal of Professor LoPucki 28 is adopted.
This will make it more difficult for a filer to file in the wrong
place, and will make an incorrect filing a more culpable act than
under the current system. When one files with respect to all col-
25. According to this section:
[a] filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not in all of
the places required by this section is nevertheless effective with regard
to any collateral as to which the filing complied with the requirements
of this Article and is also effective with regard to collateral covered by
the financing statement against any person who has knowledge of the
contents of such financing statement.
U.C.C. § 9-401(2).
26. "Whichever secured party first perfects his interest... takes priority
and it makes no difference whether or not he knows of the other interest at the
time he perfects his own." Id. § 9-312(5) & cmt. 5, example 2.
27. Section 9-401(2) requires "knowledge of the contents of [the] financing
statement." This is different from the "knowledge of the security interest" used
in § 9-301(1)(c)-(d) and knowledge of "the filing" as stated in § 9-401(2) prior to
the 1957 revisions.
28. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 581, 591.
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lateral at the place of incorporation of the debtor, it will be diffi-
cult to file in the wrong place. This possibility make it easier for
the filer to do it right, but not necessarily easier for the searcher
to find an incorrect filing. This proposal diminishes the need and
justification for section 9-401(2).
If section 9-401(2) is carefully limited to cases in which the
first to file actually lays eyes on the defectively filed financing
statement, it is a trivial exception to the priority rules and can
easily be tolerated. The risk to the efficiency of the system is that
courts may ream larger the section 9-401(2) hole and thus allow
a variety of parties to slip through, even when the first to file has
not laid eyes on the defective financing statement.29 Cases sub-
29. Some cases seem to require only that the searcher know that the mis-
filer has a security interest. See, e.g., In re Mistura, Inc., 705 F.2d 1496, 1498
(9th Cir. 1983) (noting that "knowledge of the facts contained in a financing
statement, even though learned in ignorance of the improperly filed financing
statement, satisfies the requisite knowledge requirement of the [UCCI"); Secur-
ity Fin. Group, Inc. v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 83, 85-86 (D.D.C. 1989) (credi-
tor's misfiled financing statement was effective against IRS under the "actual
knowledge/good faith" exception contained in § 9-401(2) where the debtor had
told IRS agent that certain proceeds of a contract were committed to payment of
creditor's claim); In re Davidoff, 351 F. Supp. 440, 442, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(bank's unperfected security interest in debtor's dental equipment prevailed
over manufacturer's interest in same equipment where debtor informed princi-
pal of manufacturing company that equipment had been pledged to the bank); In
re Nemko, Inc., 136 B.R. 334,339-41 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (debtor moved from
New Jersey to New York and New Jersey bank did not perfect as to accounts in
New York, yet New Jersey bank prevailed over New York bank because New
York bank had knowledge of prior unlapsed New Jersey security interest of New
Jersey bank); In re Johnson, 28 B.R. 292, 296-97 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1983) (bank's
perfected security interest in debtor's farm equipment failed as against equip-
ment manufacturers' imperfected interests where bank assisted debtor in pre-
paring detailed cash flow statements and acquired knowledge of debtor's
financial obligations); Franklin Nat'l Inv. Corp. v. American Swiss Parts Co.,
201 N.W.2d 673, 674 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (where debtor informed creditor that
equipment purchased was financed by seller, creditor had knowledge of the con-
tents of the financing statement and thus failed to prevail over seller's misfiled
interest); ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Robinson, 350 So. 2d 48, 51 (Miss. 1977)
(where equipment manufacturer sold equipment and then learned that equip-
ment was in turn leased to a third party, equipment manufacturer had knowl-
edge of the contents of the financing statement and thus could not take priority
over lessor's misfiled security interest); First Nat'l Bank v. First Sec. Bank, 721
P.2d 1270, 1273-74 (Mont. 1986) (where cattle rancher informed second bank
that first bank had a security interest in his cattle, second bank had knowledge
of the contents of the financing statement and could not prevail over first bank's
misfiled financing statement); In re Enark Indus., 383 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797-98
(App. Term 1976) (first creditor's misfiled security interest took priority over sec-
ond party's perfected interest where second party was aware that debtor's collat-
eral had previously been pledged).
For cases requiring more than knowledge of the interest, see, J.I. Case Co.
v. Crestar Bank, No. 90-2659, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1045, at *11-*12 (4th Cir.
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ordinating creditors who only know of the prior interest but have
not actually gleaned information from a financing statement un-
dermine and could destroy the pure race rule in section 9-312.30
I favor the abolition of section 9-401(2). As an alternative,
one might add language to the Code or to the Comments to re-
strict section 9-401(2) to the case of the later searcher whose
agent actually lays eyes on the errant financing statement.
c. Perfection by Possession
Efficiency might direct that a person who perfects an inter-
est by possession be subordinate to a later filer-it might just be
efficient to abolish possession as a way of achieving priority over
those perfected by filing.3 ' Why? First, possession as an indica-
tion of ownership is surely in decline. Leasing is everywhere.3 2
By hypothesis, ownership and possession are divided in every
lease. In modern commercial and mercantile society-where lit-
tle business is done by individuals and much is done by corpora-
tions-possession is never by John of his cow, but rather by
General Electric's or General Motors's agent on behalf of the cor-
poration. The inferences that one could draw from a party's pos-
session in feudal English society at the time of Twyne's Case
33
cannot be and are not drawn today. At a minimum, one must ask
Jan. 25, 1991) (requiring exact knowledge of contents of financing statement);
First Natl Bank & Trust, Wibaux v. First Nat'l Bank of Greybul, 582 F.2d 524,
526-27 (10th Cir. 1978) (statute relating to misfilings should be narrowly con-
strued); Goldberg Co. v. County Green Ltd., 438 F. Supp. 693, 697-98 (W.D. Va.
1977) (requiring knowledge of contents of misfiled financing statement; knowl-
edge of contents of security agreement insufficient); In re Ruf, 32 B.R. 169, 171-
72 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983) (where A and B both misfiled, and A learned of B's
security interest, A's subsequent proper filing secures A's priority notwithstand-
ing A's prior awareness of B's interest); accord United States v. Waterford No. 2
Office Ctr., 271 S.E.2d 790, 791-92 (Ga. 1980); accord Citizens State Bank v.
Peoples Bank, 475 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
30. See supra note 29 (citing cases where knowledge is of security interest
and not specifically of contents of financing statement).
31. Here I disregard the right of the trustee in bankruptcy. Surely the
trustee in bankruptcy should be subordinated to a secured creditor who takes
possession.
32. Some estimate that equipment leasing in the United States has been
growing at a rate of approximately 30% per year. Amelia H. Boss, The History of
Article 2A. A Lesson for Practitioner and Scholar Alike, 39 ALA L. REv. 575, 576
(1988). As of December 1987, equipment leasing accounted for over 20% of all
annual capital investment in the United States, and over $310 billion in lease
receivables was estimated to be outstanding. Gregory J. Naples, A Review and
Analysis of the New Article 2A-Leases Amendment to the UCC and Its Impact on
Secured Creditors, Equipment and Finance Lessors, 93 CoM. L.J. 342, 343 n.2
(1988).
33. 3 Coke Rep. 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
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whether a possessor is a lessee. In many cases it will be neces-
sary to investigate the possessor's agency status to determine
which fictitious entity is considered in law to be in possession of a
particular good. In modem mercantile society, one might con-
clude possession does not tell enough to earn priority.34
A second reason why possession might receive a lesser sta-
tus than formerly is that it now seems to be infrequently used as
a mode of perfecting. Pledges were once common. Perfection by
possession of stock certificates and possession by a field ware-
houseman's possession were widely used, but the latter has de-
clined in use with the rise of filing, and the former is threatened
with extinction by the new Article 8 and by the disappearance of
certificates from debtors' possession.35
What efficiencies would be gained by allowing the first to file
to have priority over a secured creditor who perfected by posses-
sion prior to the filing? The change would free the secured credi-
tor of the need to confirm the debtor's possession of the collateral,
and would eliminate lawsuits dependent on questionable claims
of possession. The filing system would be elevated one more
notch.
Still there are problems. First, what of the case in which
goods are in the hands of a bailee? In certain trades36 apparently
it is common for commercial warehousemen to hold goods that
are subject to security interests. The practice in those cases is to
perfect by giving notice to the bailee, not by filing. If one were to
outlaw perfection and priority arising from possession, somehow
34. For an argument supporting perfection by possession and advocating
that possession be found where a reasonable person would be put on notice of a
third party's claim, see Steven 0. Weise, Perfection by Possession: The Need for
an Objective Test, 29 IDnAo L. Ruv. 705, 712-15 (1992); see also David A. Ebroon,
Perfection by Possession in Article 9: Challenging the Arcane But Honored Rule,
69 i-m. L.J. 1193 (1994) (discussing irrationality of rule that bailees cannot be
controlled by the debtor and proposing that bailees may be controlled by either
the debtor or the secured party).
35. See Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 8, Discussion Draft, Re-
porter's Prefatory Note xvii-xxiii (April 9, 1993):
Virtually all publicly traded corporate and municipal securities are still
issued in certificated form... .The certificates representing the largest
portion of the shares, however, are not held by the beneficial owners,
but by clearing corporations. Settlement of securities trading occurs
not by delivery of certificates or by registration of transfer on the
records of the issuers or their transfer agents, but by notation on the
records of clearing corporations and securities intermediaries.
36. See In re Julien, 136 B.R. 743, 745-47 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1991) (ad-
dressing practice of warehousemen storing cotton subject to third party liens).
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one would have to change the practices of the participants in
those trades.
Even more troublesome is the case of the seller who retains
possession of sold goods. Because section 2-401(1) makes the
seller's retention of title a mere security interest, the competition
with the King is under Article 9, not Article 2. Recall the outrage
caused by Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,37 when
the court subordinated the interest of the seller of goods despite
the seller's unbroken possession of the goods. The secured seller
did not lose to another creditor because of section 9-312, but to a
buyer in the ordinary course under section 9-307. Even so, the
case was thought to be unfair because it was inconsistent with
the legitimate expectations of the seller in continuous possession.
I suspect that the outrage Tanbro Fabrics caused arises from
sellers' expectation that their rights are always protected by
their possession of goods. I doubt they could be disabused of this
notion by a change in the rules on priority under section 9-312.
Despite the decline of possession as an indicium of ownership,
current practice and expectation probably require us to recognize
the rights of the possessor, even against the King, and to retain
the rule in section 9-312(5) that subordinates the first to file to
someone who has perfected by earlier possession.
Where does this leave the law when the first to file competes
with prior interests? I would change only one rule: abolish sec-
37. 350 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976). For responses to Tanbro Fabrics, see John
F. Dolan, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Concept of Possession in the
Marketing and Financing of Goods, 56 TFm L. Rav. 1147 (1978); Donald L. Krei-
ndler, The Uniform Commercial Code and Priority Rights Between the Seller in
Possession and a Good Faith Third Party Purchaser, 82 CoM. L.J. 86, 89 (1977);
Homer Kripke, Should Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply
Against a Secured Party in Possession?, 33 Bus. LAw. 153 (1977). But see Harold
F. Birnbaum, Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Versus Posses-
sory Security Interests-A Reply to Professor Homer Kripke, 33 Bus. LAw. 2607
(1978); Samuel Gottlieb, Section 9-307(1) and Tanbro Fabrics: A Further Re-
sponse, 33 Bus. LAw. 2611 (1978).
When the PEB Study Group finally addressed the issue in 1992, it recom-
mended the following:
A. The definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business" in § 1-
201(9) should be revised to provide that the earliest time that a buyer
can achieve the status of a buyer of goods is the time that the buyer
obtains the right to possession of the goods under Article 2.
B. Section 9-307(1) should be revised to provide that a buyer in
ordinary course of business does not take goods free of a security inter-
est if the secured party is in possession of the goods, rejecting the hold-
ing of Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 590
(N.Y. 1976).
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDy
GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTicLE 9, REPORT 191 (1992).
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tion 9-401(2). Section 9-401(2) presumes that it would be unfair
to allow one with knowledge of the contents of an improperly
filed financing statement to have priority. Given the decision,
based presumably on efficiency concerns, that the party first to
file is superior to a prior security interest that is known to it, I
cannot distinguish the section 9-401(2) case, and I conclude that
we should favor efficiency here. By hypothesis, the competitor
has failed to comply with the law on filing. That creditor is only
incrementally less culpable than the person who has done no fil-
ing at all. And the first to fie competitor is not necessarily more
culpable.
Of course, one could argue against a pure race statute.38
But having concluded that a pure race statute is appropriate,
why allow one to achieve priority over a prior secured claim even
with full knowledge of every detail of that claim, as long as the
details are acquired directly from the secured creditor or from
the debtor and not from an improperly fied financing statement?
Section 9-401(2) should be repealed.
Most of the King's losses to prior parties can be justified by
noting that only a small set of persons dealing with rights to per-
sonal property expects those rights to be recorded in and con-
trolled by a public filing. In that respect, Article 9's filing system
and its users' expectations are different from the real estate title
recording system, with its users' expectations that recording is
necessary against other claimants of all kinds. Because of those
expectations, the rules in the Code are generally correct in refus-
ing to recognize the first filing as a route to priority over earlier
claimants who are not themselves secured creditors.
Secured creditors are different; it is fair to expect them to
check the files and to file to perfect their own interests. When
they do not do so effectively, it is fair to subordinate them. Driv-
ing all secured sheep into the filing pen will eventually produce
efficiency at small cost to fairness, but it is too soon to reject pos-
session as a mode of earning priority. Perhaps the drafters can
subordinate possessors in the first revision of the twenty-first
century when possession has even more diminished significance
than it does today.
38. See David G. Carlson, Rationality, Accident, and Priority Under Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 MN. L. REv. 207, 209-11, 235-40 (1986)
(race priority of Article 9 began as an accident, continues through public apathy,
and advantages professional over amateur lender).
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2. Later Claimants to the Same Collateral
The general rule of Article 9, embodied in sections 9-201, 9-
301, and 9-312, is that the first to file has priority over all subse-
quent claimants whether those parties are perfected secured
creditors, lien creditors, trustees in bankruptcy, or buyers. Even
with the collateral to which a security interest of the first to file
has attached, however, and disregarding the problems of after-
acquired property and proceeds, Article 9 subordinates the first
to file to a handful of creditors under section 9-103, to certain
buyers of goods under sections 9-301 and 9-307, and to certain
purchasers of paper under sections 9-308 and 9-309.
I readily concede priority to two of these subsequent claim-
ants. First are holders in due course of negotiable instruments
that are subject to prior security interests; these rights are recog-
nized by section 9-309.3 9 In this provision worlds collide. To say
that a secured creditor who files a financing statement should
have priority over a holder in due course because of that filing
contradicts the very idea of a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument. Except as to proceeds, a filing does not even perfect
a security interest in negotiable instruments and that seems cor-
rect, both on fairness and efficiency grounds. Any other rule
would not only conflict with the expectations of the parties, it
would produce difficulties and inefficiency in markets where ne-
gotiable instruments are transferred from one party to another
without reference to any external record of title.
The same is true of the claims of a buyer in the ordinary
course in section 9-307(1). The classic buyer in the ordinary
course purchases from inventory at retail. To check files is the
farthest from the imagination of that person. In normal cases,
the secured creditor does not expect to retain its security interest
against the ordinary course purchaser and, in fact, hopes that its
debtor will sell all of the inventory in the ordinary course. A rule
that provides otherwise would violate fairness and efficiency
principles.
39. According to this section:
[n]othing in this Article limits the rights of a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument (Section 3-302) or a holder to whom a negotiable
document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-501) or a bona fide
purchaser of a security (Section 8-302) and such holders or purchasers
take priority over an earlier security interest even though perfected.
Filing under this Article does not constitute notice of the security inter-
est to such holders or purchasers.
U.C.C. § 9-309.
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Now compare my four remaining examples of subsequent
claimants to the same collateral. These are professional pur-
chasers of paper under section 9-308, creditors under section 9-
301(4), non ordinary course buyers under section 9-307(3), and
creditors who take security interests in goods that have moved
across state lines or intangibles owned by debtors who have
moved across state lines. On both fairness and efficiency, the
claims of all four of these are weak when compared to the claim
of the first to file. I discuss each in detail.
a. Purchasers of Paper under Sections 9-308, 3-302
Under section 9-308, a purchaser of chattel paper or of nego-
tiable instruments may take priority over a prior perfected secur-
ity interest that is perfected by filing or is claimed "merely as
proceeds" of inventory. The section reads in full as follows:
A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives new value
and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has
priority over a security interest in the chattel paper or instrument
(a) which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing and
temporary perfection) or under Section 9-306 (perfection as to proceeds)
if he acts without knowledge that the specific paper or instrument is
subject to a security interest; or
(b) which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a
security interest (Section 9-306) even though he knows that the specific
paper or instrument is subject to the security interest.40
The section was amended in 1972. Before that time it was more
limited.41 What if the drafters repealed section 9-308 and
amended section 3-302(c) so that a secured creditor who
purchased multiple notes in one transaction was not a holder in
due course? If modifying section 3-302(c) would offend the gods,
the drafters could limit themselves to repealing section 9-308.
40. Id. § 9-308.
41. The 1962 official draft of § 9-308 read in full:
A purchaser of chattel paper or a non-negotiable instrument who
gives new value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his
business and without knowledge that the specific paper or instrument
is subject to a security interest has priority over a security interest
which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing and tempo-
rary perfection). A purchaser of chattel paper who gives new value and
takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has priority
over a security interest in chattel paper which is claimed merely as pro-
ceeds of inventory subject to a security interest (Section 9-306), even
though he knows that the specific paper is subject to the security
interest.
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To measure the efficiency and fairness of this rule, we should
first ask who are the beneficiaries of the rule.42 They are profes-
sional buyers of chattel paper. They are in the business of buy-
ing paper and know more about the UCC filing system than most
of us do. Presumably they check the files and find out who has
security interests in chattel paper perfected by filing. If section
9-308 were repealed, they would have to go to the prior perfected
secured creditor and seek subordination. Alternatively, they
could buy out the senior creditors or raise their own interest
rates to offset the risks of taking a subordinate position.
Because those protected by section 9-308 are by hypothesis
sophisticated business buyers of paper, their claim for protection
from the King is weaker than the claim of buyers in the ordinary
course, for example. 43 Clearly, these are knowing players in the
secured credit market and there would be nothing unfair about
subordinating them to a prior filed interest.
The argument for keeping section 9-308 must ride on effi-
ciency grounds. But what are those-what makes it efficient for
a person to purchase paper already subject to a prior public se-
curity interest? If the person is a holder in due course buying a
single note, the answer is easy, but if the purchaser is one of
those contemplated in section 9-308, who buys in bulk,4 it is not
clear why it is efficient to grant that person victory over the King.
Perhaps denial of priority would obstruct these transactions.
Possibly the transaction would go forward, but at a higher cost
because of the need for a subordination agreement between the
junior and senior creditors. None of that is obvious. Starting
with the hypothesis that the King should win unless there is an
efficiency or fairness grounds on which to rule otherwise, I find
none and conclude that section 9-308 ought to be repealed.
42. For cases dealing with § 9-308, see Grey v. Jefferson Loan & Inv. Bank,
127 B.R. 296, 305-06 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Na-
tional Credit Corp., 473 S.W.2d 876, 880-81 (Ark. 1971); Blazer Fin. Services,
Inc. v. Harbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 623 So. 2d 580, 582-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 533-34 (Sup. Ct. 1968)
(applying pre-1972 § 9-308); Associates Discount Corp. v. Old Freeport Bank,
220 A.2d 621 (Pa. 1966) (applying pre-1972 § 9-308); Borg-Warner Acceptance
Corp. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 713 S.W.2d 351, 356-58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
43. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing buyer in ordinary
course).
44. Note that except to the extent a transferor has rights as a holder in due
course, a purchaser (transferee) of negotiable instruments as part of a bulk
transaction does not acquire rights of a holder in due course. See U.C.C. § 3-
302(3)(c).
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The cloudy language of section 9-308(b) makes it a particu-
larly inviting target for repeal. The "merely as proceeds" phrase
in section 9-308 defies definition and has been the subject of a
trickle of litigation.45 In fact, section 9-308 invites knowing but
silent claimants to take a security interest and then hope for the
best in litigation with the prior perfected secured creditor. Why
not force the junior creditors to negotiate with the senior, to be
sure that neither is misled by the other's presence? Repeal of
section 9-308 would do that.
b. Creditors under Sections 9-301(4) and 9-307(3)46
Both of these subsections were added in 1972.47 They are
among the most obnoxious of the underbrush in Article 9 and
should be among the first removed. It is so difficult for a lien
creditor to fit under section 9-301(4) that it is unclear if one has
ever nested there.48 Why degrade the prior perfected secured
creditor's interest to take account of such an insignificant and
unlikely claimant?49 Why not make the buyer in section 9-
307(3)50 take subject to the prior security or force the buyer to
negotiate with the secured creditor? By hypothesis, this person
45. See, e.g., Rex Fin. Corp. v. Great W. Bank & Trust, 532 P.2d 558, 560-62
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (holding purchaser of chattel paper who gives it new value
and takes possession in the ordinary course of business has priority over secur-
ity interest claimed as proceeds of inventory subject to security interest); Inter-
national Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 211 S.E.2d 430,
433-34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (noting lender had priority over debtor as to chattel
paper and returned trucks under UCC § 9-308).
46. Section 9-301(4) provides:
A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is
perfected takes subject to the security interest only to the extent that it
secures advances made before he becomes a lien creditor or within 45
days thereafter or made without knowledge of the lien or pursuant to a
commitment entered into without knowledge of the lien.
Section 9-307(3) provides:
A buyer other than a buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection(1) of this section) takes free of a security interest to the extent that it
secures future advances made after the secured party acquires knowl-
edge of the purchase, or more than 45 days after the purchase, which-
ever first occurs, unless made pursuant to a commitment entered into
without knowledge of the purchase and before the expiration of the 45
day period.
47. See id. §§ 9-301, 307 (Official Statement of Reasons For 1972 Changes
In Official Text).
48. Of course my argument can be turned on me: If it is so unlikely, what
harm? I retreat to aesthetics; a statute should be sparse, not lush.
49. See UNI Imports, Inc. v. Aparacor, Inc., 978 F.2d 984, 987-91 (7th Cir.
1992) (interpreting UCC § 9-301(4)).
50. See Spector United Employee's Credit Union v. Smith, 263 S.E.2d 319,
321-22 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (addressing application of UCC § 9-307(3)).
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is not a buyer in the ordinary course. This person either buys
from someone not in the business of selling goods of the kind sold
(i.e., buys equipment) or otherwise somehow fails to be a buyer in
the ordinary course. In either case, why not force the buyer to
deal with the person who has a prior interest? Neither the claim-
ants under section 9-301(4) nor those under section 9-307(3) has
a strong fairness claim. Lien creditors are not reliance creditors,
of course, and the buyers section 9-307(3) covers are not buyers
in the ordinary course.
I see no efficiency argument for these rules. Because they
add complexity to a complex statute, they threaten the certainty
and therefore the efficiency of other provisions. At best, they
have no effect; at worst, they might obscure the workings of the
more important provisions of Article 9 and lead an occasional
judge to a wrong conclusion. Added in 1972, they should be
removed.
c. Moving Goods and Debtors under Section 9-103(1)(d)
Section 9-103(1)(d) reads in part as follows:
When collateral is brought into and kept in this state while subject
to a security interest perfected under the law of the jurisdiction from
which the collateral was removed, the security interest remains per-
fected, but if action is required by Part 3 of this Article to perfect the
security interest,
(i) if the action is not taken before the expiration of the period of
perfection in the other jurisdiction or the end of four months after the
collateral is brought into this state, whichever period first expires, the
security interest becomes unperfected at the end of that period and is
thereafter deemed to have been unperfected as against a person who
became a purchaser after removal[.]5 1
Suppose section 9-103(1)(d) were changed to read as follows:
When collateral is brought into and kept in the state while subject to a
security interest perfected under the law of another jurisdiction from
which the collateral was removed, the security interest remains per-
fected for the same period it would have remained perfected in the other
jurisdiction had the collateral not been brought to this state.
This change (and a similar change to section 9-103(3))52 would
continue perfection despite the movement of the goods or the
change of the debtor's location.
51. U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d).
52. Id. § 9-103(3). This section provides:
(3) Accounts, general intangibles and mobile goods.
(e)'A security interest perfected under the law of the jurisdiction of
the location of the debtor is perfected until the expiration of four
months after a change of the debtor's location to another jurisdiction, or
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What are the gains and losses from a repeal of the current
rule? First, innocent creditors in other states could be misled.
One cannot deny that possibility, but it is just possible that credi-
tors already account for the chance that goods have come from
another state. Moreover, with the adoption of multistate com-
puter networks, it may soon be easy and inexpensive to check the
files in a particular debtor's name in many states.53 When check-
ing the files in an adjoining state consists of merely sitting at a
computer terminal and adding a few key strokes, the cost of mon-
itoring another state's filing system is trivial. Note, too, that this
problem will be minimized if Professor LoPucki's proposal is
adopted, for under that proposal the movement of the goods will
not require a filing in a new state.54 His system will routinely
involve examination of files in a state far removed from the
debtor's and creditor's place of business, in all cases where the
debtor is incorporated out of state.55
I think it both fair and efficient to put the burden on the new
lender in the new state to discover either that the goods have
moved (and therefore to find a filing in another state under the
current rules), or that the debtor's place of incorporation has
changed (and so it must find a filing in the old place of incorpora-
tion). This is particularly true with computerization of filing and
searching, and with the potential of changing filing to place of
incorporation.
Here the potential gains seem large. Amendment of section
9-103 would leave searchers slightly worse off and filers far bet-
ter off. Abolition would do away with litigation concerning time
of movement, change in debtor's place of business, and the like.
56
until perfection would have ceased by the law of the first jurisdiction,
whichever period first expires. Unless perfected in the new jurisdiction
before the end of that period, it becomes unperfected... as against a
person who became a purchaser after the change.
53. As of January 1995, UCC information in some form was available on
LEXIS from eight states, real estate tax information from 31 states, and real
estate transfer information from 22 states.
54. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 591-94 (noting that because corporation can-
not change its state of incorporation, moving goods will not require new filing).
55. Id. at 593-619 (advocating filing based on state of incorporation).
56. See, e.g., BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAw OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3.8[4] (2d ed. 1988) (describing possible
problems with double debtors and the first to file rule); Steven L. Harris, The
Interaction of Articles 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Study in Con-
veyancing, Priorities, and Code Interpretation, 39 VAND. L. REV. 179, 222-25, &
n.182 (1986) (attempting to reconcile undesirable impact of first to file rule in
context of bulk purchases involving two debtors); Charles H. Oldfather, Floor
Plan Financing Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 U. KAN. L.
REv. 571, 582-84 (1966) (discussing scenarios involving two debtors and priority
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With or without Professor LoPucki's amendment,5 7 section 9-
103(1)(d) and the comparable rules in section 9-103(3) should be
changed to preserve the perfection of the King despite change of
debtor's location or movement of the goods.
Purchasers, secured creditors, lien creditors, and other
transferees who claim the same collateral that is already subject
to a prior filed interest have a particularly difficult time justify-
ing their superiority over the King. They do not necessarily add
new value like the purchase money lender. Their claims do not
precede secured creditors' interests like the lessor's claims. They
do not even claim different collateral the way the proceeds and
after-acquired claimants do. Even though they are later in time,
even though some of them are professionals (those under section
9-308), and even though they claim the very same collateral, they
have the audacity to claim priority over the prior filed secured
creditor. Because of the prior filing as to exactly the same goods,
and because advances in the filing system are on the horizon,
these creditors' claim for priority do not appeal to my sense of
fairness. To me it seems at least as fair to subordinate them as
to raise them.
Their claim for efficiency is at best muddled. No one can
show that the added search costs of out of state creditors (that I
would impose) will exceed the reduction in monitoring costs of in-
state creditors. With radically better filing and searching sys-
tems, the reverse seems probable. For all of these reasons I ar-
gue that sections 9-301(4) and 9-307(3), and parts of section 9-
103 as well as section 9-308 ought to be repealed. The outcome
opposite from the one now mandated by these sections is likely to
be more fair and more efficient than the current outcome
mandated.
3. Later Claimants to Derivative or After-Acquired Collateral
Where collateral is after-acquired or where collateral has
changed into proceeds, the King's claim is weaker, because the
notice given by the filing is marginally less effective, and the ex-
pectations both of the original filer and of subsequent claimants
are perhaps different than if the collateral had never changed
status. Three sections elevate various subsequent claimants to
this derivative collateral over the first to file. First is section 9-
rules); Robert H. Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 925, 948 (same).
57. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 593-619 (identifying benefits of filing based on
state of incorporation).
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402(7), which allows a subsequent secured creditor to take prior-
ity over the first to file as to collateral acquired more than four
months after a reorganization or a name change that renders the
original filing seriously misleading.58 A second section concerns
certain claims to proceeds. 59 In these cases, the debtor is an out-
of-state debtor, requiring either perfection in a new state as
goods become intangibles, or filing in a new office within the
state because collateral changes from farm products to some-
thing else, or vice versa. The third section is the purchase money
lender who enjoys priority under sections 9-312(3) or (4) when it
finances the debtor's acquisition of new collateral. 60 I vote for
change of section 9-402(7), and section 9-306, but not of sections
9-312(3) and (4).
a. Name Changes under Section 9-402(7)
Section 9-402(7) reads in part as follows:
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization
its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed financing state-
ment becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to perfect
a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four
58. U.C.C. § 9-402(7).
59. Id. § 9-306.
60. Id. § 9-312(3)-(4). This section provides:
(3) A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has
priority over a conflicting security interest in the same inventory and
also has priority in identifiable cash proceeds received on or before the
delivery of the inventory to a buyer if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the
time the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in
writing to the holder of the conflicting security interest if the holder
had filed a financing statement covering the same types of inven-
tory (i) before the date of the filing made by the purchase money
secured party, or (ii) before the beginning of the 21 day period
where the purchase money security interest is temporarily per-
fected without filing or possession (subsection (5) of Section 9-304);
and
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the
notification within five years before the debtor receives possession
of the inventory; and
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has
or expects to acquire a purchase money security interest in inven-
tory of the debtor, describing such inventory by item or type.
(4) A purchase money security interest in collateral other than in-
ventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same col-
lateral or its proceeds if the purchase money security interest is
perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or
within ten days thereafter.
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months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement
is filed before the expiration of that time.6 1
Suppose the quoted sentence were changed to read as follows:
Where the debtor changes its name, identity or corporate structure,
or engages in a merger, reorganization, or other change of business en-
tity, a financing statement properly filed in the original name remains
effective until it expires under section 9-403(2).
What would be the consequence of such change? First, it would
end all litigation on the question whether a name change ren-
dered a secured creditor unperfected. 62 That the debtor formerly
did business as Greentree Manufacturing, but now does business
as General Electric Corporation, would not matter, and no
amount of argument could unseat the secured creditor who had
filed under Greentree Manufacturing. The clarity of the rule
would discourage most potential plaintiffs, however disap-
pointed, and would allow for summary judgment against the fool-
ish plaintiff who might claim otherwise.
The modification would, of course, cause a second change.
Under the current filing system it would require any searcher to
know every name its debtor used in the last five years, whether it
was the name of the debtor's current organization or whether it
was the name of a predecessor organization. The searcher would
thus have to cross examine potential debtors, possibly get war-
ranties from them or their lawyers, and search under all of those
names.
But there would be savings, too. The secured creditor who
had originally filed in the proper name at the time of the filing
would have no need to search the files thereafter, to monitor
against changed names, mergers, or other acts that might render
the filing "seriously misleading." If the reduction in monitoring
costs of existing filers offsets the searching costs of existing and
prospective filers, the reduction of litigation by eliminating this
sentence in section 9-402(7) would create a pure efficiency sur-
plus. Even if the new search costs outweigh the monitoring
costs, there would be a gain to the extent some of the savings
61. Id. § 9-402(7).
62. For cases involving § 9-402(7), see In re Bluegrass Ford-Mercury, 942
F.2d 381, 386-88 (6th Cir. 1991); PA Record Outlet, Inc. v. Mellon Bank, N.A.,
894 F.2d 631, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1990); In re West Coast Food Sales, Inc., 637 F.2d
707 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Forehand, 121 B.R. 892, 894-95 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1990); In re Meyer-Midway, Inc., 65 B.R. 437,442-44 (Bankr. N.D. IMl. 1986); In
re Centennial Indus., 3 B.R. 416, 417-18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); Citizens Say.
Bank v. Sac City State Bank, 315 N.W.2d 20, 25-28 (Iowa 1982); Union Nat'l
Bank v. BancFirst, 871 P.2d 422, 425-26 (Okla. 1993).
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from reduction in monitoring and reduction in litigation out-
weighed the new search costs.
If Professor LoPucki's proposal is adopted,63 the Secretary of
State (who would maintain the filings of corporate names and
charters and the UCC files) could make an entry in the Article 9
filing index for every name change and corporate reorganization.
Then a search under the debtor's old or new name would produce
all filings under either name. That should clinch the case for the
abolition of section 9-402(7).64 Abolishing section 9-402(7) might
save a lot and cost little. Adoption of Professor LoPucki's propo-
sal completely undermines its reason for being.
b. Proceeds under Section 9-306
Section 9-306(3) concerning perfection of proceeds reads as
follows:
The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected secur-
ity interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it
ceases to be a perfected security interest and becomes unperfected ten
days after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor unless
(a) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and
the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected
by filing in the office or offices where the financing statement has been
filed and, if the proceeds are acquired with cash proceeds, the descrip-
tion of collateral in the financing statement indicates the types of prop-
erty constituting the proceeds; or
(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and
the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds; or
(c) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the ex-
piration of the ten day period.
Except as provided in this section, a security interest in proceeds
can be perfected only by the methods or under the circumstances per-
mitted in this Article for original collateral of the same type.
One might change it to read as follows:
63. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 581, 591 (proposing filing for all corporate
debtors for all collateral at the place of incorporation).
. 64. Ignoring these changes for a moment, I have no idea how to compare the
efficiency of a regime without § 9-402(7) with the efficiency of the current re-
gime. It is not intuitively obvious that the monitoring costs saved by abolition
would be less than the new costs of investigation required by abolition. I suspect
that even now diligent creditors ask a debtor to disclose all of the names under
which it has done business in the last five years and that these creditors search
under all those names.
Of course, the debtor might lie and, if so, the current law would save the
searcher in certain cases where the proposed law would not. I wonder how often
a debtor lies at the outset of a transaction to its prospective creditor about the
names and organizations under which it has done business for the past five
years. Might the number be insignificant?
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The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected secur-
ity interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected.
This modification returns to the 1962 Code, where checking
the block on the original UCC-1 perfected a security interest in
proceeds wherever located, irrespective that an original filing to
perfect as to the proceeds might have been far removed from the
filing actually made as to the original collateral. 65 As with the
two suggestions above, this change would increase the searching
burden and reduce the monitoring burden. It would mean that
those who wished to lend against accounts receivable or other
tangible and intangible assets would have to trace their ancestry
(these accounts are from the sale of what inventory located
where?) and would have to search at the location of the ancestral
assets in the name of the debtor.
If Professor LoPucki's proposal is adopted, 66 most of the
problems with section 9-306 will disappear. The principal prob-
lem under current law is the requirement of a filing at the physi-
cal location of goods, combined with a requirement of a filing at
the place of the debtor's location as to proceeds when those goods
turn into intangible proceeds. Assume a debtor is incorporated
in Illinois and has its principal place of business there, but has a
plant in Ohio. A secured creditor takes a security interest in the
goods in Ohio and files in Columbus. When those goods are sold
and produce accounts receivable, the proper filing as to the ac-
counts is at the Secretary of State's office in the state of the
debtor's principal place of business, Springfield, Illinois. If the
secured creditor fails to file there, it becomes unperfected. Under
the LoPucki proposal, the original filing would be in Springfield,
and no new filing would be required to continue perfection in in-
tangible proceeds. In that regime, both section 9-306(3) and my
suggestion for modification of section 9-306 are beside the point.
Absent Professor LoPucki's proposal, the costs and benefits of
modification would be similar to those described above with re-
65. UCC § 9-306(3) in the 1962 Code read:
The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected secur-
ity interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it
ceases to be a perfected security interest and becomes unperfected ten
days after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor unless
(a) a filed financing statement covering the original collateral
also covers proceeds; or
(b) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before
the expiration of the ten day period.
66. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 581, 591 (recommending filing for all assets at
the place of incorporation of the debtor).
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spect to sections 9-407(2) and 9-103.67 Here as elsewhere
smarter programs and better computer access reduce the
searcher's cost and favor repeal of the current rule.
c. Purchase Money Security Interests in Sections 9-312(3)
and (4)
Exactly why a purchase money secured creditor who comes
later in time and is on notice of prior perfected security interests
deserves priority over that interest is not clear.68 Yet purchase
money secured creditors are the most direct challengers of the
King and enjoy most the best recognized priority of all those con-
sidered in this paper. Their rights are specifically set out in very
same section that anoints the King and recognizes his pure race
rights. What justifies this purchase money priority?
Perhaps fairness commands priority for purchase money
lenders. It might be argued that a seller, less likely a financer,
naturally expects to have priority as to the assets that it sells to a
debtor. An intelligent business person who is ignorant of Article
9 might reflect: "I own this commodity. No one else has any
claim to it; therefore, I must be able to control the rights in it. If
I retain rights, such as a security interest, I must have priority
over all others because that security interest is merely a lesser
right than I hold now." Of course, if that expectation is the basis
67. For cases involving § 9-306(3), see, e.g., In re Reliance Equities, Inc.,
966 F.2d 1338, 1342 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding because creditor did nothing to
perfect its security interest during 10-day period of automatic perfected security
interest after sale of promissory note, security interest was unperfected); In re
Keneco Fin. Group, Inc., 131 B.R. 90 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding creditor
had perfected security interest in proceeds of debtor's equipment leases as long
as creditor had perfected security interest in leases themselves); In re Kirk, 71
B.R. 510 (C.D. ]M. 1987) (holding UCC § 9-306(3) permits security interest in
proceeds of collateral sold to be automatically perfected for only 20 days unless
the interest is perfected by filing a financial statement covering the original col-
lateral within the 20 days).
68. Bob Summers and I have given the following feeble defense:
[T]he debtor needs some protection from a creditor who has filed a fi-
nancing statement with respect to his goods, but who is unwilling to
advance additional funs.... Thus, the purchase money provisions give
the debtor somewhat greater bargaining power and at least theoreti-
cally enlarge his ability to get credit.
2 JAMES J. WmITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNFORM COMMERCLL CODE, PRACTI-
TIONER'S EDITION 504 (3d ed. 1988).
More elegant but no more persuasive, Jackson and Kronman defend the
purchase money device protection against "situational monopoly." Thomas
Jackson & Anthony Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities among Credi-
tors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167-75 (1975).
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for the purchase money priority rule, section 9-312(3),69 which
requires notice to the prior filers, and section 9-312(4),7o which
depends on prompt filing or retention of possession, are without
justification because they already violate that expectation.
Given those limitations on the rights of the purchase money
lender, it is hard to justify them on the grounds that we are
merely conforming to the expectation of the clear thinking busi-
ness person.
A second justification for purchase money priority relates to
efficiency. By giving the debtor the possibility of granting first
priority to a subsequent purchase money lender, one may facili-
tate socially desirable transactions that would not otherwise oc-
cur. Conceivably, a secured creditor who has a perfected security
interest in all of the debtor's inventory, or inventory and equip-
ment, including after-acquired property, might refuse to make a
new loan for the purchase of new assets. Yet a seller or another
financer of the debtor might make a different evaluation of the
debtor's creditworthiness and thus be willing to finance a new
acquisition-at least if it could be assured of priority in the as-
sets to be acquired. Assuming these transactions are socially de-
sirable, they should be facilitated.
Although that efficiency often is asserted, I have never seen
it proven. First, one must assume the original lender will not
lend on the same terms as the purchase money lender. Second,
one must assume that the second lender does not intend to buy
out and thus replace the first lender, for that would be possible
even without the purchase money rules. Third, one must assume
the second lender is unwilling to lend unsecured, or that it would
charge an additional interest fee that would exceed the costs (on
others) of granting a prior perfected security interest. Fourth,
one must assume the potential injury to the first fier, from suf-
fering a purchase money lender with priority, is outweighed by
the potential gain from the new transaction.
Finally, one must assume the transaction-which the new
lender will finance, but the old lender will not-is more likely to
increase the wealth of the parties than to decrease it. Conceiva-
bly the first lender has declined to lend, not out of vindictiveness,
but because of its view that the debtor is already as deeply in
debt as it should be. It is possible that an empirical examination
of purchase money loans would show that the debtor's optimism
is unwarranted and that most purchase money loans that would
69. See supra note 60 (providing text of UCC § 9-312(3)).
70. See supra note 60 (providing text of UCC § 9-312(4)).
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not have been made by the original debtor lead to bankruptcy,
not to riches.
Note, too, that there are costs to the King in allowing
purchase money priority. First is the possibility that the original
lender and the purchase money lender's assets or proceeds will
become commingled, causing a dispute between them. Second is
the possibility that both the original lender and the subsequent
lender will ultimately be partially unsecured, and thus the first
lender will suffer injury by a reduction of the percentage it will
be paid on its unsecured portion. 7'
Furthermore, the transaction could take place even in the
absence of a particular priority rule that favors purchase money
lenders. In the absence of sections 9-312(3) and (4), the second
lender would have to negotiate for subordination of the first
lender.
To me, the most persuasive claim for purchase money prior-
ity is the fairness argument-that reasonable business people
expect to have priority when they sell goods from their own stock.
Perhaps this idea is embedded so deeply in mercantile expecta-
tion that it must be recognized by the Code in order to meet the
legitimate expectations of our honest but ill informed mercantile
actor.
Even so, the question remains whether purchase money
rights should be extended beyond the seller. Conceivably section
9-107 ought to be limited to sellers and should exclude financers.
Presumably those financers would not be misled. They would
know the need to get subordination agreements and the same
fairness arguments could not be made on their behalf as would
be made on behalf of the seller. Of course, modifying section 9-
107 could produce silly behavior, such as the financer's purchas-
ing the goods and then purporting to sell them to the debtor to fit
within the purchase money rules. Note that we are now on un-
easy ground where the intelligent but uninformed business per-
son may be injured because of failure to give notice under section
9-312(3) or failure promptly to perfect under section 9-312(4).
I suspect that the status quo is too powerful to challenge
here. Perhaps the widespread recognition of purchase money
priority says that it is either fair or efficient or both. I still have
my doubts. At least the drafters should appreciate that the case
for priority of purchase money loans over earlier filed creditors
71. For an explanation how a later lender injures an earlier secured creditor
when both are partially unsecured on debtor's insolvency, see Alan Schwartz,
Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2073 (1994).
[Vol. 79:529
REALLOCATING RISK
has always been uneasy. I would not shed a tear over the aboli-
tion of sections 9-312(3) and (4).
CONCLUSION
Most of my judgments about the proper priority of the first to
file are tentative. I raise them not because I imagine that every
change I might suggest is wise or politic, but because I think it
important for the drafters to consider alternative rules and to
question their assumptions. And the drafters need to be re-
minded of their ignorance. In response to almost every empirical
question that could be asked about current creditor behavior-
much less about behavior in response to new law-we have only
anecdotal evidence. When representatives of debtors and of se-
cured and unsecured creditors of every stripe appear at the draft-
ing committee meetings and make confident assertions, we hear
assertions, not proof. Recognizing their ignorance, the drafters
should ask what laws should be enacted in the face of that
ignorance. 72
Next the drafters should ask what implications arise from a
cheaper, better, and more effective filing system. Given the pos-
sibility that one may soon be able sit at a computer and search
files with respect to the debtor's name or ID number in every
state, do the rules in sections 9-306 or 9-103 make sense? Pre-
sumably the better and more accessible the file, the more reli-
ance we can put on it and the less reliance is necessary on rules
such as those in section 9-103. Arguably computerization and
ever smarter software make searching correspondingly easier
and the results more reliable. These technological advances may
justify some of the changes that I propose.
Finally, by encouraging them to focus on efficiency as well as
fairness-they are not necessarily inconsistent-I hope to get
the drafters to remove some of the ugly brush that has grown up
in Article 9 over time. I want them to understand how fairness
to a few often brings complexity to many. By detracting from the
clarity and certainty that should characterize commercial law,
compleity may ultimately bring unfairness too.
72. Unable to prove the value of any other rules, perhaps they should con-
centrate on reduction of transaction costs.
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